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November 20, 2026 |

VMware vCenter authentication bypass zero-day fixed

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At a glance:

  • On November 20, 2026, Google threat intelligence team disclosed that a suspected China-nexus threat actor tracked as ARMORY CASTLE exploited CVE-2026-123890 as a zero-day beginning in early September 2026.

  • CVE-2026-123890 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in VMware Directory Service within VMware vCenter Server. Successful exploitation can provide administrator-level access to vCenter without valid credentials.

  • Broadcom released fixes on November 18, 2026 with no workarounds available. Organizations using vCenter Server, VMware Cloud Foundation, vSphere Foundation, Telco Cloud Platform, or Telco Cloud Infrastructure need to verify deployed versions and determine whether remediation is required.

Threat summary

On November 19, 2026, Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant disclosed that a suspected China-nexus threat actor tracked as ARMORY CASTLE (formerly UNC5221) had been exploiting CVE-2026-123890 as a zero day since at least early September 2026.

CVE-2026-123890 affects VMware vCenter Server, the central management platform for VMware virtual infrastructure. The vulnerability resides in VMware Directory Service (vmdird), which supports vCenter's SSO infrastructure and stores user identities, authentication data, and the key used to sign SAML authentication tokens. A threat actor with network access to vCenter can exploit the vulnerability to bypass authentication and obtain administrative access without valid credentials or user interaction.

Affected versions include:

  • vCenter 9.1.x before 9.1.1.0200
  • vCenter 9.0.x before 9.0.2.0200, and
  • vCenter 8.0 before Update 3m

The vulnerability is also present in vCenter deployments bundled with VMware Cloud Foundation (VCF) 5.x and 9.x, vSphere Foundation, Telco Cloud Platform, and Telco Cloud Infrastructure. Unsupported vCenter 7.0, 6.7, and 6.5 deployments are presumed affected. The issue is present in both standalone deployments and environments using Enhanced Linked Mode (ELM).

The intrusion documented by GTIG shows how CVE-2026-123890 was used to move from an existing foothold inside a network to administrative control of the virtualization environment. Initial access was obtained through CVE-2026-102764, a separate zero-day vulnerability in BeyondTrust Remote Support.

After compromising the internet-facing appliance, the threat actor scanned the internal network for vCenter services, including ports 443, 2012, and 5480. The threat actor then moved to internal Linux appliances that were not running endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools and deployed web shells for command execution and file staging.

From those systems, the threat actor used BONESAW, a custom exploitation tool developed for CVE-2026-123890, against the vCenter service on TCP port 2012. The exploit returned an authenticated administrator session without requiring valid credentials. The adversary then created a new single sign-on (SSO) administrator account and copied the VMware Directory Service (vmdird) database containing the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) signing key.

A second tool, SAWSNAKE, used the stolen key to forge SAML authentication tokens, allowing the threat actor to impersonate users and bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA).

The threat actor subsequently accessed an ESX host and copied the Active Directory (AD) database and registry hives directly from a Windows virtual machine disk without logging into the guest operating system. The stolen files were then staged on the compromised BeyondTrust appliance for likely exfiltration.

Analysis

The environments most relevant to this threat are those where vCenter is reachable from networks beyond a dedicated administration segment. Internet exposure is not required. In the activity observed by GTIG, the threat actor reached vCenter from an existing foothold inside the victim environment. Any compromised server, appliance, remote access platform, or administrative workstation capable of communicating with vCenter can provide a path to exploitation.

Threat actors target vCenter because it acts as a central point of control for virtual infrastructure. Administrative access to vCenter can provide visibility into virtual machines, hypervisors, permissions, snapshots, storage, and automation workflows. In many environments, access to vCenter effectively becomes access to the infrastructure supporting domain controllers, application servers, databases, backup platforms, and other business-critical systems.

The vulnerability itself provides administrative access to vCenter, but the impact observed during exploitation extended well beyond that initial access. GTIG documented SSO account creation, theft of the SAML signing key, authentication token forgery, access to ESX hosts, and theft of Active Directory credential material. The extent of additional impact depends on the environment, particularly the systems managed by vCenter, federated identity integrations, stored credentials, and administrative privileges assigned to the platform.

Patching removes the authentication bypass but does not remove access already obtained through exploitation. Administrative accounts, stolen signing keys, forged authentication tokens, SSH access, and other persistence mechanisms can remain in place after the vulnerability has been remediated. For organizations with vCenter systems that were exposed during the timeframe described by GTIG, patching is one part of the response and may need to be accompanied by investigation and credential review.

Mitigations

To identify affected systems, review all deployments of:

  • vCenter Server

  • VMware Cloud Foundation

  • vSphere Foundation

  • Telco Cloud Platform

Include production, disaster recovery, development, and management environments when validating version information.

Upgrade affected systems to vCenter 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.2.0200, or 8.0 Update 3m. Review support options for vCenter 7.0 deployments and older versions that are no longer in general support. No workaround is available.

Limit network access to vCenter management interfaces to authorized administrative systems. Review firewall rules, segmentation controls, VPN access, and management networks that allow connectivity to vCenter.

Review vCenter authentication activity, SSO account creation, ESX host access, appliance management activity, and virtualization administration logs for signs of unauthorized activity dating back to early September 2026. Include systems affected by CVE-2026-102764 in BeyondTrust Remote Support within the scope of any investigation.

Where evidence of compromise is identified, replace the vCenter SAML signing certificate, rotate credentials managed by or accessible through vCenter, review administrative accounts, and investigate connected systems for follow-on activity.

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